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ETHICS, INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEXITY AND
HEALTH CARE REFORM: THE STRUGGLE
FOR NORMATIVE BALANCE
Michael 1. Graetz and Jerry L. Mashaw*

This essay has two messages: First, whatever the complexity of its articulation or its interest-group politics, reforming the financing and provision of American health care is ultimately a normative undertaking.
Indeed, to some it takes on the quality of a moral crusade. This is not to
say however, that the ethical foundations of health care reform are unitary, even coherent. Health care reform responds to a multitude of ethical demands. The ethical "goodness" of any plan will, therefore, be a
question of its "balance" among those various ethical claims.
This trite observation leads to a more complex second message - one
that seems often to be overlooked by those who decry the complexity of
most proposals for reforming American health care finance and delivery.
The more uncertain or compromised the choices among values, the more
likely the scheme will exhibit high levels of institutional complexity. For
complex institutional arrangements often are devices for managing conflict and uncertainty. In this sense, a health care plan can be viewed as a
design for the conduct of further struggles over both the "right" and the
"good." A system that has resolved more of these struggles in a relatively
straightforward way can have a simpler institutional design. More importantly, we argue, no ethically acceptable system is likely to have wholly
coherent ethical commitments. Hence, institutional complexity is a necessary price for ethical acceptability.
To elaborate on this point, we begin by indicating the broad ethical
bases for the Clinton proposals and by discussing the reasons why these
"ethical foundations" for health care reform are simultaneously attractive
and grotesque, mutually contradictory, but also mutually supportive. Our
message here is straightforward: We could choose an administratively or
institutionally simpler model only if we were prepared to make certain
ethical commitments now to a single ethical perspective. To the extent
* Michael J. Graetz is Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor of Law and Jerry L. Mashaw is
Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School.
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that we are not - that is, in order to hedge our ethical bets and to take a
more ethically balanced approach - we must construct a much more
complex regime and live with the consequences of that complexity.
Beyond this message, we have one further argument. The normative
ambiguity or conflict surrounding health care reform, and the probable
institutional complexity of the resulting proposals, should not blind us to
the urgency of the task. In our view, the desirability of particular health
care arrangements should be viewed from the perspective of the balance
that a regime strikes among competing ethical commitments. No single
balance is necessarily "best" in any demonstrable sense. But that does
not mean that any balance is as good as any other. As an example of this
latter point, our concluding section sketches our reasons for believing
that America's current health care arrangements fail virtually all the ethical tests that might be applied to a health care system, including the test
of appropriate balance among ethical commitments.
I.

FOUNDATIONAL AMBIVALENCE

In a refreshing departure from normal political behavior, the first draft
made public of the Clinton health care reform proposals begins with a
section entitled "Ethical Foundations of Health Reform." The ethical
principals enunciated, however, look in quite different directions.1 The
plan speaks of universal access to comprehensive benefits and of assuring
equality of care for all Americans. These sentiments suggest that health
care is a personal right with a strong egalitarian flavor. Yet, the plan also
lists consumer choice and personal responsibility as essential elements of
its ethical foundations, along with professional integrity as well as professional responsibility to provide effective, high quality care. These concerns reflect autonomy values often associated with individualism and
markets, while also emphasizing the inviolability of the physician-patient
relationship. Egalitarianism and individual autonomy are values that
tend to compete in any system of social organization, at least as those
values are conventionally understood.
Moreover, in setting forth its ethical foundations, the plan also talks
about costs. It demands that there be a "wise allocation of resources"
and a fair distribution of costs both within and across generations. Partic1. Of the fourteen "values and principles" set forth as the "Ethical Foundations of
Health Reform," we do not discuss three: (1) effective management; (2) fair procedures;
and (3) local responsibility - the question of allocation of powers and responsibilities
among national and state and local governments. On the latter, see Jerry L. Mashaw, The
Case for State-Led Reform, 2 DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 1 (1993).
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ularly when exhorting us to "balance prudently" what we spend on health
care against "other important national priorities," the plan speaks the
language of utilitarian balancing of social needs. Once again, tension is
created between this new value and those previously articulated. Making
marginal trade-offs to maximize overall welfare is a language that usually
eschews talk of moral or legal entitlement and focuses on social welfare
rather than individual rights, personal responsibilities or professional
autonomy.
In short, the Clinton health care reform plan has been grounded explicitly in multiple normative foundations that compromise the very coherence of its ethical commitments. But this compromise - indeed conflict
- should not necessarily be taken to signal weakness. No single ethical
perspective is likely to provide an acceptable solution to either of the two
critical issues that confront any health care system: the determination of
the total proportion of national resources to be expended on health care
and the allocation of health care resources within that global resource
commitment. To see why, we need to unpack the Clinton Plan's ethical
ideals. In each case we will do so by analyzing these issues in terms of the
clusters that inhabit the Clinton health plan's multiple ethical foundations. We will characterize these general commitments as commitments
to the ideas (1) of entitlement, (2) of choice, and (3) of trade-offs to
achieve the greatest good for the greatest number.
II.

DETERMINING TOTAL RESOURCEs ALLOCATED TO HEALTH

The overall health care budget could be determined simply by asking
how much it would cost. to provide everyone with all beneficial medical
care. The answer seems straightforward. Since we are talking not just
about lifesaving procedures, but rather of all those things that alleviate
pain and increase functional capacity, there probably is no limit to the
potential expenditures on marginally beneficial care. "All beneficial
care" can absorb 100 percent of gross domestic product. This absolutist
approach to the medical care entitlement is so self-evidently unworkable
that we need not tarry in discussing it.
The practical necessity of rejecting an absolutist approach nevertheless
reveals a potentially serious ethical conflict: to do so clashes with the
idea of professional autonomy. For the provision of all beneficial care is
the underlying ethic that now dominates the training of medical professionals. Hence, unless we wish to change medical ethics - and it is not at
all clear that we do - medical providers must be induced to practice
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within some set of overall arrangements that constrain the fulfillment of
their professional ethical commitments.
Providing the level of care for Americans that optimizes social welfare
is an obvious alternative candidate for determining the share of national
resources that should be devoted to medical care. Conceptually, this utilitarian approach is simple: Spend on medical care up to the point that
social spending on something else would produce greater marginal returns. In practice, of course, the computation required to achieve this
goal is quite impossible. As is customary with general utilitarian calculations, we run up against two insurmountable difficulties. First, we do not
know how to measure the value of various social outputs in the same
metric. A bit more cold prevention versus a bit more laughter? Who
knows how to do such a calculation individually, much less socially? Second, utilitarianism has never managed to overcome the principal objection of its longstanding critics - the necessity of making interpersonal
utility comparisons.
Moreover, utilitarianism has the vices of it's virtues. As our colleague
Calabresi (who is celebrated in this symposium) has taught us, we may
well not wish to allocate resources to medical care - particularly lifesaving medical care - on the basis of some overall social calculation. There
is symbolic importance to affirming the value of individual lives that may
lead us to want to behave in a quasi-absolutist fashion, at least in some
contexts, whatever the overall social calculation of costs and benefits.
The standard utilitarian response - that these symbolic values should
simply be counted in the utilitarian calculus - seems to miss the essential
point, for it merely circles us back to the measurement obstacles we have
just described. Given these difficulties, the utilitarian approach is often
simultaneously unworkable and unacceptable.
Focusing instead on the moral value of each individual life leads rather
directly to the third general ethical foundation set out in the Clinton proposal, an emphasis on individual autonomy. A health care system based
on the overarching value of autonomy or autonomous choice would be
one prepared to allocate just that amount of national resources to health
care that equals the sum that individuals would choose to spend on health
care at market prices. If incomes were equal, consumer choice well-informed, and no market distortions affected the supply side of medical
care, autonomous choice through markets might well be the ideal means
for determining the overall national resources allocated to health care.
We know, of course, that these conditions do not hold. Indeed, in the
world of medical economics, they are largely absent. Moral hazard, ad-

1994]

Struggle for Normative Balance

verse selection, supply-induced demand, barriers to entry, information
asymmetries and the like combine forcefully to undermine the free market program.
Not to belabor the point, the choice of a single ethical principle to
guide global budget-setting in a health care system would lead fairly
quickly to the unworkability or moral bankruptcy of that system. No
health care system, therefore, chooses a unitary foundational principle to
guide public policy-making. As with the Clinton plan and its competitors,
competitive ethical principles must be combined in some complicated
way, often ways that are only implicit in the construction of the plan itself. Indeed, rather than starting with ethical first principles, most health
care planning - both here and abroad - is grounded in some historical
baseline with respect to overall costs (such as what we are spending now)
and some vague definition of the culturally accepted entitlement (i.e., "all
reasonable and necessary" care).2 The question then becomes how acceptable the population finds the status quo, including the means by
which existing arrangements might be continued and reinforced, by comparison with the ends and means articulated in one or another reform
proposal.
Policy choice then moves incrementally from a given position and
within a given context, not by tabula raza theorizing from ethical first
principles to implementing policies. Establishing principles of entitlement, necessary trade offs with other priorities (through the inevitable
balancing of uncertain costs against non-measurable benefits) and the
preservation of individual choice and professional autonomy are not unimportant in this process. Indeed, they may be crucial. But they are crucial as motivations or constraints that shape arguments concerning the
legitimacy or desirability of both existing arrangements and proposed
changes, not as building blocks in some logico-deductive system of health
care planning. Thus, if trade-offs among these ethical perspectives were
not enough to induce institutional complexity, the added burdens of history and of cultural and political contingency will virtually assure that
simplicity is an early casualty in all health care planning wars.
III.

SETTING PRIORITIES WITHIN THE OVERALL BUDGET

Standard means of priority setting within health care systems or health
care reform plans are characterized by a similar "anti-foundationalist"
2. "Reasonable and necessary" is the Canadian formulation. Borrowing from extant
health insurance contracts, the Clinton plan relies on "necessary and appropriate."

98

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:93

ethical approach. Priorities are not constructed from the bottom up (or is
it "top down"?) by establishing ethical foundations and then taking them
to their logical conclusions in the implementation of policies. To do so is
to end up with an unacceptable, perhaps grotesque, system. Consider
once again the usual alternatives.
Entitlement absolutists, of course, reject the necessity of setting (explicit) priorities. But, because the failure to make choices is the health
care equivalent of rejecting the force of gravity, absolute entitlements approaches must smuggle in implicit priority-setting devices. One possibility might be to define strictly what is and what is not medical care identifying things that are in and things that are out of the medical care
system. But, since the absolute entitlement approach has no internal criterion for denying the appellation "medical care" to any product, procedure or social action that potentially would improve individual or
population health, the explicit rejection of anything arguably beneficial to
health is necessarily, and all too obviously, arbitrary.
An alternative and less visible strategy relies on a delegation of authority to the medical profession to define "necessary or appropriate care" in
the context of practice. Fear of allocating all of GDP to health care, however, has led other nations to bound this discretion within some budget
constraint thereby denying in the aggregate what they proclaim at the
level of individual practice. This may be a politically saleable position,
but it clearly conflicts with the ethical posture of absolute entitlements.
Nor need we extensively critique the autonomous market-choice solution to prioritizing within the health care budget. Certainly, a "free market" is a clear and effective means of priority determination. Indeed, the
market sets priorities and the overall budget simultaneously as the simple
vector-sum of spending by individuals. But, a badly distorted health care
market is a no more reliable mechanism for implementing autonomy in
priority setting than in budget building. Market defects, such as moral
hazard and suppliers' control over demand, distort decisions at the individual, level as well as in the aggregate. This is not to say that using certain "market like" devices and incentives to force people to face up to
some of the costs of their choices might not be a good idea. Our point is
merely that an autonomy-through-markets solution is not a general solution to priority setting within health care any more than to determining
overall budget allocations to health care.
Although the measurement problems remain problematical, certain
variations on the utilitarian theme seem to have greater attraction in the
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priorities arena than they had when attempting to establish the size of the
overall' budget. There is, after all, the possibility that, with the budget
being set, some rough and ready calculations are possible with regard to
what the most effective use of those funds might be within the domain of
health care. However, once again, there are some serious problems.
Cost effectiveness analysis must ask "cost effectiveness for what?" Additionally, in the- arena of health, the specification of the "what" may produce radically different, and often objectionable, allocations of resources
within the health care budget. We will discuss just three possibilities to
provide a flavor of the difficulties:
One approach was pioneered on the battlefield and marches under the
label "triage." In its battlefield form the "Cost effective for what?" question is answered: "For life saving, stupid." Persons generally are sorted
into three groups: Those who will live whether or not they receive immediate medical care; those who will die whether or not they receive immediate medical care; and those for whom immediate medical care will
make the difference between living and dying. Giving immediate care to
the third group is the clear priority.
While the implicit definition of health care as only that which is life
saving may make perfect sense under battlefield conditions of extreme
scarcity, it is not acceptable as an overall solution to setting priorities
within the health care system. Once we leave the battlefield, the preservation of life is not the only thing we care about. Therefore, spending our
whole health care budget on preserving life, whatever its quality and
however long or short, is not satisfactory as a simple rule of decision. In
many instances, we will look not only for other measures that include the
alleviation of pain, the improvement of functioning, and a host of other
values when determining what our medical care system is for, but we will
also find many circumstances for elevating these over heroic life saving
3
measures.
An alternative approach would be to allocate medical care resources in
ways that maximize the restoration of normal functioning for the whole
of the population. This need-based approach to cost effectiveness in
medical care is both attractive and grotesque. Taken to its logical conclusion, it would cause us to spend most, if not all, of our resources on those
who had the worst medical conditions and who needed the greatest care

3. Triage may still be used, but for different and far more limited purposes, such as
who gets seen in a walk-in or urgent care clinic.
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and assistance in order to achieve what was agreed to be the equivalent of
''normal" social functioning.
While there is much to be said for greater expenditures on those who
are "least advantaged" in Rawlsian terms, it is hard to believe, that we
wish to prioritize all our medical resources in this way. Indeed, assuming
that we are operating within a budget constraint that binds, an attempt to
structure priorities to maximize normal functioning for each individual
would require eliminating virtually all interventions that merely alleviate
pain or speed up the recovery of people who would approach or return to
normal functioning without any expenditure of social resources on their
medical care.
"Allocate all resources to restore or create normal functioning for each
individual" is, thus, an inadequate unitary guide to health care priority
setting. It implicitly abandons both the relatively well and the dying in
favor of a strong, perhaps even exclusive, allocation of health care resources to those with serious conditions, but some potential for normal
functioning if given heroic allocations of medical care services and technologies. Like an exclusive focus on lifesaving, this approach is far too
narrow to satisfy our moral demands for a more "balanced" approach to
priority setting.
In an effort to add more scientific precision and balance to cost effectiveness analysis in medical care, some have suggested using the idea of a
"quality adjusted life year" (QALY) as the metric for comparing the
value of medical care expenditures.4 The basic idea is just this: A year of
perfect health forms one end of the continuum of quality, death the
other. A year of perfect health is rated at one and death at zero. Any
impairment or illness that detracts from perfect health reduces an individual life-year from a value of one to something between one and zero.
Hence, the life year has been "quality adjusted" for health losses.
These "quality adjustments" are done by panel surveys in which respondents are asked to determine how many years of life with certain
illnesses or disabilities they would be willing to trade for a year of perfect
health. If respondents who have - or, more usually, who are asked to
imagine they have - condition A would trade twenty years of life with
that condition for ten years of life with no health problems, then condition A gets a rating of .5 in the quality adjustment scale. Any medical
4. For a more extensive analysis, see Chapter 5 of PAUL MENZEL, STRONG
MEDICINE: THE ETHICAL RATIONING OF HEALTH CARE (1990). See also Alan Maynard,
Logic in Medicine: An Economic Perspective, 295 BRITISH MED. J. 1537; John Harris,
QAYLifying the Value of Life, 13 J. MED. ETHICS 117 (1987).
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intervention that will alleviate condition A can be determined to be relatively effective or ineffective by a computation which compares its cost
with the cost of some other procedure that alleviates a similarly rated
condition for someone having a similar number of years of life before
them. Thus, for example, if conditions A and B both create .5 valued
quality adjusted life years, but the costs of alleviating B are less than the
costs of alleviating condition A, the procedures that alleviate B will have
a higher priority in a health care system that measures cost effectiveness
in terms of quality adjusted life years.
The QALY approach may appear precise and even sensible, but it has
some rather obvious problems, not the least of which is its capacity to
produce ethically grotesque results. For example, the alleviation of a condition (x) which is quite trivial in terms of the loss of quality of life (say
.01) may nevertheless be cost effective if it is extremely inexpensive. After all, if curing condition x costs only five cents, the expenditure of $25
could buy 100 such procedures for 50 persons having a one year life expectancy producing a QALY value of 5. However, using this sort of calculation implies that such an expenditure would be preferred to the
expenditure of $25 on saving a single individual from an immediately life
threatening condition, where the person in question has a four year life
expectancy. Five QALYs beats four QALYs, even if this literally means
the provision of 100 bandaids and no tourniquets. The ease with which
similar examples can be generated is alone sufficient to make QALY
analysis unattractive as the singular guide to the expenditure of medical
resources.
But this is not the only feature of the QALY approach that may be
morally objectionable. Because evaluating QALYs entails a consideration of the number of remaining years of life, and not just their quality,
there is a certain "ageism" built into the procedure. To be sure, many
persons are reasonably comfortable with preferring the young to the aged
in situations of dire necessity. But, a similar advantage with regard to
routine allocation of medical care is clearly less morally attractive.
Moreover, this sort of distinction between persons based on one aspect
of their individuality - in this case, age - highlights the basic underlying
disquiet that the QALY system induces in most persons. Do we as a society really want to make allocation decisions based on gross indicators
such as age, or the presumed quality effects of some health condition on a
particular individual's enjoyment of life? Are we willing to accept the
systematic disfavoring in such a system of anyone with a chronic illness or
disease and for whom medical intervention for acute and life threatening
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conditions could never have a value of one times life expectancy? Does
not the QALY procedure simply mask our disquiet about poignant tradeoffs among individuals, all of whom have unique but differentiated claims
to social resources, through a scientistic quantitative formula that ignores
the human dimensions that are necessary to humane decisionmaking
about medical care priorities?
Once again, however, to reject the QALY approach as the basic guide
to setting priorities within a health care system is not to say that it has no
value for any purpose. When the QALY methodology is used to compare
resource allocations across health care systems, it may reveal striking differences in medical care allocation decisions and challenge us, to think
carefully about the allocations made within our own system. Yet, it is
quite unlikely that many of us could come to believe that we ought to
think about health care systems in a world series or world cup format in
which the system with the best QALY scores was for that reason alone
the most ethically attractive health care system.
Given the sensible ethical objections to each of the absolutist, marketbased and cost-effectiveness solutions to internal priority setting within
medical care systems, it is hardly surprising that we see mixed approaches
to the determination of medical care priorities. As in the case of global
budget setting, nations "muddle through," using some set of historically
contingent coverage definitions and institutional arrangements to economize on utilization. Notions of entitlements, market incentives and cost
effectiveness evaluation cohabit uneasily in setting the priorities of any
medical care system. Yet, cohabit they must, for we are understandably
unwilling either to use any single method alone or to reject any one of
them as entirely without merit.
How then should we think about health care systems from an ethical
point of view? If the idea is not to determine basic ethical foundations
both for building overall budgets and for prioritizing within them, and
then developing policies to implement those ethical commitments, how
are we to proceed? Our basic, admittedly untidy, claim is that we do and
must approach these issues from an essentially Aristotelian perspective,
asking: What is the balance of normative commitments structured into
the system and how does this balance comport with our sense of appropriate total resource allocation and internal priority setting? This is an
untidy approach because it attempts to incorporate all of the ethical foundations that are moderately attractive in making resource allocation decisions, while not giving a clear preference to any one of them. Moreover,
it asks a question which is highly contingent and culturally contextual.
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The appropriate "balance" of the system will be perceived differently by
different observers and may vary widely across cultures or even within
the same culture at different times. Indeed, the "approach" that we suggest here as necessary in health care arrangements may be so complex,
ambivalent and vague that it has little critical bite for just the issues that
must be confronted.
To some degree this criticism is fair. Yet, we maintain that there is
enough here to help explain, in ethical terms, why certain solutions tend
to be favored at this time in our society above others. In particular it can
explain why health care reform is currently such an urgent priority for
many Americans.
IV.

THE ETHICAL INADEQUACY OF CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS

One straightforward explanation for why health care reform is currently high on the agenda of American politics is that our current arrangements fail all reasonable tests of ethical institutional design. The
entitlements approach is clearly not satisfied by a system that leaves
thirty-five to forty million persons (many of them children) uncovered,
and many more fearful of inadequate or lost coverage. On the other
hand, for those who enjoy adequate health insurance coverage, the current system seems to incorporate an absolutist prejudice that threatens us
with national bankruptcy. The persistence of supply-driven demand, a
third-party-payer system that makes costs invisible at point of service,
and a tax system that fosters substitution of health insurance for cash
wages and consumption of health care (particularly by the affluent) in
preference to other goods, can hardly be taking the maximization of general welfare - or even cost-effectiveness - very seriously.
Moreover, as we discussed above, we know that the health care market
is structured in such a way that the underlying ethic of markets, their
responsiveness to autonomous individual choice, is virtually absent from
American medical care. Our "choices" reflect the judgments of uninformed patients propelled by the supply side inducement of ubiquitously
available high-tech high-cost diagnostic and treatment methodologies and
the absolutist professional tendencies of physician "advisers." '"Patient
autonomy" under current arrangements is thus often mocked by dual visions: one is of the well-insured patient trapped in a high-tech bondage
that fails to minister to her most basic human needs; the other is of the
uninsured, who must "choose" impoverishment to obtain adequate care.
In short, our current health care system balances our ethical demands
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very poorly indeed. It may well be possible to construct a system in
worse ethical balance than the one that we have. Perhaps we will do so.
But, contemplation of the status quo makes most who reflect upon it urge
taking the risks of reform, however complicated and compromised, rather
than accepting the continuation of the current, equally complex, but morally bankrupt, system.

